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Abstract. Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor net-
works are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at
passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance be-
tween the prover and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distance-
bounding protocols have been designed. However, none of the current
proposals simultaneously resists to these two frauds without requiring
additional memory and computation. The situation is even worse con-
sidering that just a few distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with
the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This ar-
ticle introduces a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol that resists
to both mafia and distance frauds. The security of the protocol is ana-
lyzed with respect to these two frauds in both scenarios, namely noisy
and noiseless channels. Analytical expressions for the adversary’s suc-
cess probabilities are provided, and are illustrated by experimental re-
sults. The analysis, performed in an already existing framework for fair-
ness reasons, demonstrates the undeniable advantage of the introduced
lightweight design over the previous proposals.
Keywords: Authentication, distance-bounding, relay attack, mafia fraud,
distance fraud, noise.
1 Introduction
A mafia fraud is a man-in-the-middle attack applied against an authentica-
tion protocol where the adversary simply relays the exchanges without neither
manipulating nor understanding them [1]. The earliest version of this attack was
introduced by Conway in 1976 and is known as the chess grandmaster prob-
lem [5]. In this problem, a little girl is able to compete with two chess grand-
masters during a postal chess game, where she transparently relays the moves
between the two grandmasters. She eventually wins a game or draws both.
This document contains content accepted for publication at the IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications [18].
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In modern cryptography, mafia frauds can typically be used against authen-
tication protocols. The adversary relays the messages between the prover and
the verifier, who think they communicate together, while there is an adversary
in the middle. This so-called mafia fraud was actually suggested by Desmedt,
Bengio and Goutier in 1987 [6] to defeat the Fiat-Shamir protocol [8].
One of the most promising field to apply the mafia fraud is the contactless
technology, especially Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) and Near Field
Communication (NFC) where the devices answer to any solicitation without
explicit agreement of their holder. Some attacks have already been performed
against both RFID and NFC systems [10,12]. Nevertheless, mafia fraud is not
limited to contactless technologies, it also threats other technologies such as
smartcards [7] and e-voting [14].
Two other attacks related to the mafia fraud exist: the terrorist fraud and the
distance fraud. The distance fraud only involves a malicious prover, who cheats
on his distance to the verifier. It was first introduced by Brands and Chaum [4],
and comes from the distance measuring process used to defeat the mafia fraud.
The terrorist fraud is a variant of the mafia fraud where the prover is malicious
and actively helps the adversary to succeed the attack [3]. No solution exists
yet to avoid this exotic fraud, which is not addressed in this paper. Additional
countermeasure must actually be considered to thwart this fraud.
As mentioned above, a distance measuring process can mitigate the mafia
and distance frauds. To that aim, Brands and Chaum [4] proposed the distance-
bounding protocols (DB protocols). The distance estimation relies on the mea-
surement of the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) of single bit exchanges. Considering
the physical impossibility to travel faster than the speed of light, RTT bounds
the distance between the parties. Several distance-bounding protocols have been
proposed [1]. However, none of the current DB protocols are lightweight and re-
sistance to both mafia and distance frauds. Furthermore, just a few of them are
able to deal with the inherent background noise of the communication channel.
Contribution. In this paper we introduce a novel DB protocol that significantly
reduces the success probability of an adversary capable of mounting both mafia
and distance frauds. Our protocol does not rely on computationally expensive
primitives, has a very low memory requirement, and is noise-resilient. There-
fore, it is efficient and suitable for extremely low resources devices. We provide
analytical and experimental results that together show the superiority of our
proposal w.r.t. to previous ones.
Organization. Further below Section 2 presents a brief background about DB
protocols. Section 3 explains the rationality behind our proposal and Section 4
introduces and details the proposal. Sections 5 and 6 are dedicated to the re-
sistance of the protocol to mafia and distance frauds respectively. Section 7
describes our noise resiliency mechanism. Section 8 provides comparative results
with several DB protocols in both scenarios the free-noise case and the noisy
case. Finally, Section 9 draws the conclusions.
2
2 Background on distance-bounding
The first lightweight DB protocol was proposed by Hancke and Kuhn’s [11] in
2005. Its simplicity and suitability for resource-constrained devices have pro-
moted the design of other DB protocols based on it [2,13,16]. All these protocols
share the same design: (a) there is a slow phase4 where both prover and ver-
ifier generate and exchange nonces, (b) the nonces and a keyed cryptographic
hash function are used to compute the answers to be sent (resp. checked) by
the prover (resp. verifier). Below, we provide the main characteristics of each of
these protocols, especially the technique they use to compute the answers.
Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [11]. The answers are extracted from two n-bit
registers such that any of the n 1-bit challenges determines which register should
be used to answer.
Avoine and Tchamkerten’s protocol [2]. Binary trees are used to compute
the prover answers: the verifier challenges define the unique path in the tree,
and the prover answers are the vertex value on this path. There are several
parameters impacting the memory consumption and the resistance to distance
and mafia frauds: l the number of trees and d the depth of these trees. It holds
d · l = n, where n is the number of rounds in the fast phase. The larger d, the
better the frauds resistance and the larger the memory consumption.
Trujillo-Rasua, Martin and Avoine’s protocol [16]. This protocol is similar
to the previous one, except that it uses particular graphs instead of trees to
compute the prover answers.
Kim and Avoine’s protocol [13]. This protocol, closer to the Hancke and
Kuhn’s protocol [11] than [2] and [16], uses two registers to define the prover
answers. An important additional feature is that the prover is able to detect a
mafia fraud thanks to predefined challenges, that is, challenges known by both
prover and verifier. The number of predefined challenges impacts the frauds
resistance: the larger, the better the mafia fraud resistance, but the lower the
resistance to distance fraud.
There exist other DB protocols with different designs and computational
complexities (e.g., protocols based on signatures and/or a final extra slow phase [4,17]).
However, they are beyond the scope of this article that focuses on lightweight
protocols only. The interested reader could refer to [1] for more details.
3 Rationality of our proposal
Being resistant to both mafia and distance frauds is the primary goal of a DB
protocol. An important lower-bound for both frauds is
(
1
2
)n
, which is the prob-
ability of a naive adversary who answers randomly to the n verifier challenges
during the fast phase. However, this resistance is hard to attain for lightweight
DB protocols. Therefore, our aim is to design a protocol that is close to this
bound for both mafia and distance frauds, without requiring costly operations
4 In DB protocols, a fast phase, which generally consists on n rounds, is a phase where
the verifier computes RTTs. Otherwise, we say that it is a slow phase.
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or an extra final slow phase. We also aim to reach the additional property of
being noise-resilient. Below, the intuitions that lead to our design are explained
for each of the three considered properties.
Mafia fraud. Among the DB protocols without final slow phase, those achieving
the best mafia fraud resistance are round-dependent [2,13,16]. The idea is that
the correct answer at the ith round should depend on the ith challenge and also
on the (i − 1) previous challenges. Our proposal also uses a round-dependent
technique, the proposed construction is significantly simpler than those proposed
in [2,13,16], though.
Distance fraud. As in mafia fraud, the best protocols in term of distance
fraud are round-dependent. However, round-dependency by means of predefined
challenges as in the Kim and Avoine’s construction [13] fails to properly resist
to distance fraud. Intuitively, as more control over the challenges the prover has,
the lower the resistance to distance fraud is. For this reason, our proposal allows
the verifier to have full and exclusive control over the challenges.
Noise-resiliency. Round-dependent protocols can hardly work in noisy envi-
ronments. A noise in a given round might affect all the subsequent rounds and
thus, these rounds becomes useless from the security point of view. Therefore,
in order to deal with noise, round-dependent protocols should be able to detect
the noisy-rounds so that the prover responses can be checked considering these
noise occurrences. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first round-
dependent DB protocol able to detect such a noisy-rounds with a high level of
accuracy thanks to the simplicity of its design.
4 Proposal
This section describes the DB protocol introduced in the paper. Initialization,
execution, and decision steps are presented below and a general view is provided
in Figure 1.
Initialization. The prover (P ) and the verifier (V ) agree on (a) a security
parameter n, (b) a timing bound ∆tmax, (c) a pseudo random function PRF
that outputs 3n bits, (d) a secret key x.
Execution. The protocol consists of a slow phase and a fast phase.
Slow Phase. P (respectively V ) randomly picks a nonce NP (respectively NV )
and sends it to V (respectively P ). Afterwards, P and V compute PRF (x,NP , NV )
and divide the result into three n-bit registers Q, R0, and R1. Both P and V
create the function fQ : S → {0, 1} where S is the set of all the bit-sequences of
size at most n including the empty sequence. The function fQ is parameterized
with the bit-sequence Q = q1 . . . qn, and it outputs 0 when the input is the empty
sequence. For every non-empty bit-sequence Ci = c1 . . . ci where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
function is defined as fQ(Ci) =
⊕i
j=1(cj ∧ qj).
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Fast Phase. In each of the n rounds, V picks a random challenge ci ∈R {0, 1},
starts a timer, and sends ci to P . Upon reception of ci, P replies with ri =
Rcii ⊕ fQ(Ci) where Ci = c1...ci. Once V receives ri, he stops the timer and
computes the round-trip-time ∆ti.
Decision. If ∆ti < ∆tmax and ri = R
ci
i ⊕ fQ(Ci) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} then the
protocol succeeds5.
Prover Verifier
secret x secret x
slow phase
picks NP ∈R {0, 1}n picks NV ∈R {0, 1}n
NP−−−−−−−−−→
NV←−−−−−−−−−
(Q,R0, R1) = PRF (x,NP , NV ) (Q,R
0, R1) = PRF (x,NP , NV )
fast phase
for i = 1, . . . , n:
picks ci ∈R {0, 1}
ci←−−−−−−−− start timer
ri = R
ci
i ⊕ fQ(Ci)
ri−−−−−−−−→ stop timer
computes ∆ti
Fig. 1. Protocol description
5 Resistance to mafia fraud
Analyses of DB protocols usually consider two strategies to evaluate the resis-
tance against a mafia fraud: the pre-ask and the post-ask strategies [1]. Although
considering these two strategies only do not provide a formal security proof, this
evaluates the resistance of the protocol, at least against these well-known attack
strategies, and is the only way known so far to evaluate DB protocols. Providing
a formal security proof of DB protocols would be interesting but is clearly out
of the scope of this paper.
This section reminds the concept of pre-ask strategy6, then identifies the
adversarial behavior that maximizes the success probability when considering
the pre-ask strategy, and the section finally computes this probability.
5 ∆tmax is a system parameter that implicitly represents the maximum allowed dis-
tance between the prover and the verifier.
6 Note that the post-ask strategy is not relevant in protocols without an extra final
slow phase [1]
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5.1 Best behavior
The pre-ask strategy consists first, for the adversary, to relays the initial slow
phase. Then, she runs the fast phase with the prover. With the answers she
obtains, she finally executes the fast phase with the verifier. In our case, we
consider that the adversary first sends a sequence of challenges c˜1...c˜n to the
legitimate prover and receives r˜1...r˜n where r˜i = R
c˜i
i ⊕fQ(C˜i) and C˜i = c˜1...c˜i for
every i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Next, she executes the fast phase with the verifier receiving
the challenges c1...cn. Given r˜1...r˜n, the adversarial behavior that maximizes the
success probability is provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The adversary’s behavior that maximizes her mafia fraud success
probability with a pre-ask strategy is: (a) For every round i where ci 6= c˜i, answer
randomly. (b) For every round i where ci = c˜i, guess the value fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i)
and answer with the value fQ(Ci)⊕fQ(C˜i)⊕r˜i where Ci = c1...ci and C˜i = c˜1...c˜i.
Proof. First, let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given that ci = c˜i, the adversary’s behavior maximizing her success
probability at the ith round is equivalent to the best behavior for guessing the
value fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i).
Proof. Given that ci = c˜i, then R
ci
i = R
c˜i
i , which means that r˜i ⊕ fQ(C˜i) =
ri⊕fQ(Ci)⇒ ri = fQ(C˜i)⊕fQ(Ci)⊕ r˜i. Therefore, either the adversary guesses
fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i) or the adversary losses this round.
In the case where ci 6= c˜i, the prover’s response r˜i does not help the adversary
since Rcii and R
c˜i
i are independent values. Therefore, there does not exist any
best behavior, i.e., whatever the adversary behavior, her success probability at
this round is 12 . This result and Lemma 1 conclude the proof. uunionsq
5.2 Adversary’s success probability
Given the adversary’s behavior provided by Theorem 1, Theorem 2 provides a
recursive way to compute her success probability.
Theorem 2. Let Mi be the event that the adversary has won the first i rounds
by following her best behavior with the pre-ask strategy. Let Si be the event that
the adversary guesses fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i) at the ith round. The probability Pr(Mi)
can be recursively computed as follows:
Pr(Mi) =
(
1
2
)i
+ Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i)
(
1− ( 12)i) .
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i) = Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1)
×
(
1
2i−1 + Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)(1− 12i−1 )
)
.
6
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) = Pr(Si−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1)
(
1− 2i−12i−1
)
+ 12
2i−1
2i−1 .
Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) = 12 + 12
Pr(Si−1|Mi−1,Ci−1 6=C˜i−1) Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6=C˜i−1)
(
1−( 12 )
i−1) 1
2
Pr(Mi|Ci 6=C˜i)
(
1−( 12 )
i
) .
Where Pr(M1|C1 6= C˜1) = 1/2 and Pr(S1|C1 6= C˜1,M1) = 1/2 are the stopping
conditions.
Proof. If Ci = C˜i, the adversary knows that fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i) = 0 and thus, her
success probability until the ith round is 1, which means that Pr(Mi|Ci = C˜i) =
1. Considering that Pr(Ci = C˜i) = (1/2)
i
and Pr(Ci 6= C˜i) = 1 − (1/2)i, then
Pr(Mi) can be expressed as follows:
Pr(Mi) =
(
1
2
)i
+ Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i)
(
1−
(
1
2
)i)
. (1)
Equation 1 states that the computation of Pr(Mi) requires Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i).
Note that Mi holds if Mi−1 holds, so:
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i) = Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) Pr(Mi−1|Ci 6= C˜i). (2)
Given that Mi−1 depends on whether Ci−1 = C˜i−1 or not, and considering
that Pr(Ci−1 = C˜i−1|Ci 6= C˜i) = 1/(2i − 1), then Pr(Mi−1|Ci 6= C˜i) can be
transformed as follows:
Pr(Mi−1|Ci 6= C˜i) = Pr(Mi−1|Ci 6= C˜i, Ci−1 = C˜i−1) Pr(Ci−1 = C˜i−1|Ci 6= C˜i)
+ Pr(Mi−1|Ci 6= C˜i, Ci−1 6= C˜i−1) Pr(Ci−1 6= C˜i−1|Ci 6= C˜i)
=
1
2i − 1 + Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
2i − 2
2i − 1 . (3)
Assuming that Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) can be computed for every i, then ac-
cording to Equations 2 and 3, Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i) can be recursively computed as
follows:
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i) = Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1)
×
(
1
2i − 1 + Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
2i − 2
2i − 1
)
. (4)
Note that, the result Pr(M1|C1 6= C˜1) = 1/2 can be used as the stopping condi-
tion for the recursion defined in Equation 4. This recursion simplifies the analy-
sis of Pr(Mi): instead of analyzing the probability to win all the i rounds, only
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the probability to win the ith round is needed. Since it depends on the adver-
sary’s behavior, and the latter depends on whether ci = c˜i or not, we compute
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) as follows:
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) = Pr(Mi|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i) Pr(ci = c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i)
+ Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1, ci 6= c˜i) Pr(ci 6= c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i).
(5)
When ci 6= c˜i the adversary answers randomly and thus Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1, ci 6=
c˜i) = 1/2. Considering this result and that Pr(ci 6= c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i) = 2i−1/(2i − 1),
Equation 5 yields to:
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi−1) = 2
i−2
2i − 1
+ Pr(Mi|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i)
(
1− 2
i−1
2i − 1
)
.
(6)
From Equation 6, we deduce that computing Pr(Mi) requires Pr(Mi|Ci−1 6=
C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i). Theorem 2 states that the adversary’s behavior in this case
is to guess fQ(Ci)⊕ fQ(C˜i). Hence:
Pr(Mi|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i) = Pr(Si|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i) (7)
We now aim at computing Pr(Si|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i). Since ci = c˜i, then
fQ(Ci) ⊕ fQ(C˜i) = fQ(Ci−1) ⊕ fQ(C˜i−1). Therefore, the adversary’s strategy
maximizing Pr(Si|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i) consists in holding her previous
guess for the (i− 1)th round. So:
Pr(Si|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci = c˜i) = Pr(Si−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1). (8)
As pointed out by Equation 8 and Equation 7, computing Pr(Mi|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1, ci =
c˜i) requires Pr(Si−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1). Since it is indexed by i− 1, we assume
that Pr(Mj) is already computed for every j < i and as shown by Lemma 2,
Pr(Si−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1,Mi−1) can be recursively computed.
Lemma 2. Given that Pr(Mj |Cj 6= C˜j) can be computed for every j ≤ i, then
Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) can be recursively computed as follows:
Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) =1
2
+
Pr(Si−1|Mi−1, Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i)
(
1− ( 12)i)
× Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
(
1
2
−
(
1
2
)i)
.
where Pr(S1|C1 6= C˜1,M1) = 12 is the stopping condition.
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Proof. By definition of fQ(.), and because Pr(qi = 0) = Pr(qi = 1) = 1/2,
Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi, ci 6= c˜i) = 1/2. Moreover, Theorem 1 states that Mi and Si
are equivalent when ci = c˜i, hence Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi, ci = c˜i) = 1. Considering
both results we obtain:
Pr(Si|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) = 1
2
+
1
2
Pr(ci = c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi). (9)
Finally, considering that Pr(Ci 6= C˜i) = 1 −
(
1
2
)i
and Pr(ci = c˜i, Ci 6= C˜i) =(
1− ( 12)i−1) 12 , the probability Pr(ci = c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) can be expressed as
follows:
Pr(ci = c˜i|Ci 6= C˜i,Mi) =Pr(ci = c˜i, Ci 6= C˜i,Mi,Mi−1)
Pr(Ci 6= C˜i,Mi)
=
Pr(Mi|Mi−1, ci = c˜i, Ci 6= C˜i)
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i) Pr(Ci 6= C˜i)
× Pr(Mi−1|ci = c˜i, Ci 6= C˜i) Pr(ci = c˜i, Ci 6= C˜i)
=
Pr(Si−1|Mi−1, Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
Pr(Mi|Ci 6= C˜i)
(
1− ( 12)i) (10)
× Pr(Mi−1|Ci−1 6= C˜i−1)
(
1
2
−
(
1
2
)i)
.
Equations 9 and 10 yield the expected result.
Lemma 2 together with Equations 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8, conclude the proof of this
theorem.
6 Resistance to distance fraud
This section analyzes the adversary success probability when mounting a dis-
tance fraud. As stated in [1], the common way to analyze the resistance to
distance fraud is by considering the early-reply strategy instead of the pre-ask
strategy. This strategy consists on sending the responses in advance, i.e., before
receiving the challenges. Doing so, the adversary gains some time and might pass
the timing constraint. In this section, the behavior that maximizes the success
probability using the early-reply strategy is identified, and then a recursive way
to compute the resistance w.r.t. a distance fraud is provided.
6.1 Best behavior
With the early-reply strategy, in order to send a response in advance in the ith
round with probability of being correct greater that 1/2, the adversary must
9
send either R0i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1||0) or R1i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1||1) where Ci−1 is the sequence of
challenges sent by the verifier until the (i− 1)th round. Theorem 3 shows that,
guessing the values fQ(Ci) for every i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} is needed to maximize the
adversary success probability.
Theorem 3. Let Ci be the sequence of challenges c1...ci sent by the verifier until
the ith round (i ≥ 1). The adversary’s behavior that maximizes her distance fraud
success probability is equivalent to the best behavior for guessing the values
fQ(C1), fQ(C2), ..., fQ(Cn−1).
Proof. In order to send a response in advance at the ith round with proba-
bility of being correct greater that 1/2, the adversary must send either R0i ⊕
fQ(Ci−1||0) or R1i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1||1). By definition, fQ(Ci−1||0) = f(Ci−1) and
fQ(Ci−1||1) = fQ(Ci−1) ⊕ qi. Therefore, R0i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1||0) = R0i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1)
and R1i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1||1) = R1i ⊕ fQ(Ci−1) ⊕ qi. Since the adversary knows the
values R0i , R
1
i , and qi, guessing the correct value at this round is equivalent to
guessing the correct value of fQ(Ci−1).
As stated in Theorem 3, computing the adversary success probability re-
quires the best behavior to guess the outputs sequence fQ(C1), . . . , fQ(Cn−1).
Theorem 4 solves this problem.
Theorem 4. The best adversary’s behavior to guess fQ(Ci) is to assume that
her previous guess for fQ(Ci−1) is correct and to compute fQ(Ci) as follows: (a)
if qi = 0, then consider fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1). (b) if qi = 1, pick a random bit ci
and consider that fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1)⊕ ci.
Proof. Assuming that qi = 0, then fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1) and thus, the probability
to guess fQ(Ci) is equal to the probability of guessing fQ(Ci−1). In the case of
qi = 1, the adversary does not have a better behavior than choosing a random
bit of challenge ci and considering that fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1) ⊕ ci. Given that
fQ() = 0 where  is the empty sequence, the proof can be straightforwardly
concluded by induction.
6.2 Adversary’s success probability
Given the best adversary’s behavior provided by Theorems 3 and 4, Theorem 5
shows a recursive way to compute the resistance to distance fraud.
Theorem 5. Let Di be the event that the distance fraud adversary successfully
passes the protocol until the ith round. Then, Pr(Di) can be computed as follows:
Pr(Di) =
1
4
Pr(Di−1) +
1
2i
+
1
8
i−1∑
j=1
Pr(Dj)
1
2i−j
.
where Pr(D0) = 1 is the stopping condition.
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Proof. Let Fi be the event that the adversary correctly guesses the value of
fQ(Ci). Then, the event Di depends on the events Di−1 and Fi−1, which can be
expressed as follows:
Pr(Di) = Pr(Di|Di−1, Fi−1) Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
+ Pr(Di|Di−1, F¯i−1) Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1). (11)
Two cases occur (a) R0i = R
1
i and (b) R
0
i 6= R1i . In the first case, the ad-
versary wins the ith round if and only if she guesses the value fQ(Ci−1), so
Pr(Di|Di−1, Fi−1, R0i = R1i ) = 1 and Pr(Di|Di−1, F¯i−1, R0i = R1i ) = 0. In the
second case, the adversary has no better probability to win than 1/2 and thus,
Pr(Di|Di−1, Fi−1, R0i 6= R1i ) = Pr(Di|Di−1, F¯i−1, R0i 6= R1i ) = 1/2. Therefore,
we deduce Pr(Di|Di−1, Fi−1) = 3/4 and Pr(Di|Di−1, F¯i−1) = 1/4. Using these
results and Equation 11 we have:
Pr(Di) =
3
4
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
4
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
1
4
Pr(Di−1) +
1
2
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1). (12)
Equation 12 states that Pr(Di) can be computed by recursion if we express
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) in terms of the events Dj where 1 ≤ j < i. Therefore, in the
remaining of this proof we aim at looking for such result. As above, in order to
analyze Pr(Di, Fi), the events Di−1 and Fi−1 should be considered:
Pr(Di, Fi) = Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1) Pr(Fi|Di−1, Fi−1) Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
+ Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, F¯i−1) Pr(Fi|Di−1, F¯i−1) Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1). (13)
Four cases should be analyzed depending on the value of qi and the events Fi
and Fi−1.
Case 1 (qi = 1, Fi and Fi−1 hold). This case occurs if the adversary correctly
guesses the challenge ci. Therefore, she provides the correct answer at this round
Rcii ⊕ fQ(Ci). So, Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1, qi = 1) = 1.
Case 2 (qi = 1, Fi and F¯i−1 hold). Given that F¯i−1 and Fi hold, the adversary
computed fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1)⊕ c˜i using a challenge different from the verifier’s
one, i.e., ci 6= c˜i. Therefore, Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, F¯i−1, qi = 1) = 12 because both
events Fi and F¯i−1 coexist only if qi = 1, then Pr(qi = 1|Fi, Di−1, F¯i−1) = 1.
Case 3 (qi = 0, Fi and Fi−1 hold). Given qi = 0, the event Fi has no effect on the
event Di. Thus, Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1, qi = 0) = Pr(Di|Di−1, Fi−1, qi = 0) = 34
because it depends on whether R0i = R
1
i . So, Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1, qi = 0) = 34 .
Case 4 (qi = 0, Fi and F¯i−1 hold). When qi = 0, then fQ(Ci) = fQ(Ci−1), which
means that this case cannot occur. Therefore, Pr(Fi, Di−1, F¯i−1, qi = 0) = 0.
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Cases 1 and 3 yield the following result:
Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1) = Pr(qi = 1|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1) + 3
4
Pr(qi = 0|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1)
=
3
4
− 1
4
Pr(qi = 1|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1). (14)
And Cases 2 and 4 yield this other result:
Pr(Di|Fi, Di−1, F¯i−1) = 1
2
. (15)
Because Pr(Fi|Fi−1, qi = 0) = 1 and Pr(Fi|Fi−1, qi = 1) = 1/2, we have
Pr(Fi|Di−1, Fi−1) = Pr(Fi|Fi−1) = 3/4. Similarly, Pr(Fi|Di−1, F¯i−1) = Pr(Fi|F¯i−1) =
1/4 because Pr(Fi|F¯i−1, qi = 0) = 0 and Pr(Fi|F¯i−1, qi = 1) = 1/2. Combining
these results with Equations 14 and 15, Equation 13 becomes:
Pr(Di, Fi) =
(
3
4
− 1
4
Pr(qi = 1|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1)
)
3
4
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
+
1
2
1
4
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
3
16
Pr(qi = 1|Fi, Di−1, Fi−1) Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) + 9
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
+
1
8
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
3
16
Pr(qi = 1, Fi, Di−1, Fi−1)
Pr(Fi|Di−1, Fi−1) +
9
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
8
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
3
16
Pr(Fi|qi = 1, Di−1, Fi−1) Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) 12
Pr(Fi|Di−1, Fi−1) +
9
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
+
1
8
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
3
16
1
2 Pr(Di−1, Fi−1)
1
2
3
4
+
9
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
8
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
1
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
9
16
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
8
Pr(Di−1, F¯i−1)
=
5
8
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
8
(Pr(Di)− Pr(Di−1, Fi−1))
=
1
2
Pr(Di−1, Fi−1) +
1
8
Pr(Di)
=
1
2i
+
1
8
i∑
j=1
Pr(Dj)
1
2i−j
. (16)
Considering that Pr(D0) = 1, Equations 16 and 12 yield the expected result.
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7 Noise resilience
Some efforts have been made in order to adapt existing distance-bounding pro-
tocols to noisy channels. Most of them rely on using a threshold x representing
the maximum number of incorrect responses expected by the verifier [11,13].
Intuitively, the larger x, the lower the false rejection ratio but also the lower
the resistance to mafia and distance frauds. Others use an error correction code
during an extra slow phase [17]. However, the latter cannot be applied to our
protocol given that it does not contain any final slow phase. Consequently, we
focus on the threshold technique.
7.1 Understanding the noise effect in our protocol
We consider in the analysis that a 1-bit challenge (on the forward channel)
can be flipped due to noise with probability pf and a 1-bit answer (on the
backward channel) can be flipped with probability pb. Further, we denote as
c˜i the bit-challenge received by the prover at the ith round, which might be
obviously different to the challenge ci. Similarly, r˜i denotes the response received
by the verifier at the ith round. As in previous works [11], the considered forward
and backward channels are assumed to be memoryless. Table 1 shows the three
different scenarios when considering a noisy communication at the i-th round in
our protocol.
Forward Noise Backward Noise Forward and
Backward Noise
P receives c˜i = ci ⊕ 1 P receives c˜i = ci P receives c˜i = ci ⊕ 1
P updates C˜i = c˜1...c˜i P updates C˜i = c˜1...c˜i P updates C˜i = c˜1...c˜i
P sends ri = R
c˜i
i ⊕ fQ(C˜i) P sends Rcii ⊕ fQ(C˜i) P sends Rc˜ii ⊕ fQ(C˜i)
V receives r˜i = ri V receives r˜i = ri ⊕ 1 V receives r˜i = ri ⊕ 1
Table 1. The three possible scenarios when some noise occurs at the ith round.
According to the protocol, in a noise-free ith round executed with a legitimate
prover it holds that ri = r˜i ⇔ fQ(Ci) = fQ(C˜i). We thus say that prover and
verifier are synchronized at the ith round if fQ(Ci) = fQ(C˜i), otherwise they are
said to be desynchronized. Intuitively, in a noise-free ith round the answer r˜i can
be considered correct by the verifier either if ri = r˜i and they are synchronized
or if ri 6= r˜i and they are desynchronized.
The challenge is therefore to identify whether the prover and the verifier are
synchronized or not. To that aim, we rise the following observation.
Observation 1 Several consecutive rounds where all, or almost all, the answers
hold that ri = r˜i (resp. ri 6= r˜i), might indicate that the legitimate prover and
the verifier have been synchronized (resp. desynchronized).
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7.2 Our noise resilient mechanism
Based on Observation 1, we propose an heuristic aimed at identifying those
rounds where prover and verifier switch from being synchronized to desynchro-
nized or vice versa. The heuristic is named SwitchedRounds and its pseudocode
description is provided by Algorithm 1.
SwitchedRounds creates first the sequence d1...dn where di = 0 if ri = r˜i,
otherwise di = 1. Following Observation 1, it searches for the longest subsequence
di...dj that matches any of the following patterns
7: (a) ∧(1+)0 (b) ∧(1+)$ (c)
1(0+)1 (d) 0(1+)0 (e) 1(0+)$ (f) 0(1+)$.
The aim of these patterns is to look for large subsequences of either consec-
utive 0s or 1s in d1 . . . dn. Note that, we do not include the patterns ∧(0+)1 and
∧(0+)$ because starting with a sequence of zeros is exactly what the verifier
expects. Intuitively, the lower the expected noise the larger the subsequences
should be. As an example, let us consider the case where the communication
channel is noiseless. Since no noise is expected, the sequence d1 . . . dn should be
equal to n consecutive zeros unless an attack is being performed. In Algorithm 1,
a threshold ∆l defines how large a matching di...dj should be in order to be an-
alyzed. We discuss a computational approach to estimate a practical value for
∆l in Section 8.
If a pattern di...dj holds that j− i ≥ ∆l, SwitchedRounds looks for the closer
index r to i + 1 such that qr = 1, and assumes that the rth round caused the
switch from synchronization to desynchronization or vice versa. To understand
this choice, let us note that a pattern di...dj implies that di 6= di+1. This could
have happened if a switch from synchronization to desynchronization or vice
versa occurred in the (i+ 1)th round. However, due to the probabilistic nature
of the noise we cannot precisely determine whether the switch occurred in the
(i+1)th round or in some (possibly close) round. What we do know is that such
a round r must hold that qr = 1, which justifies Step 5 in Algorithm 1.
Once r is found, the pair (r, s) is created where s is 0 if the switch is to
synchronization, s = 1 otherwise. Finally, SwitchedRounds recursively calls itself
to analyze the two subsequences lying on the left and right side of di...dj . The
output is the union of all obtained pairs such that they are in increasing order
(according to the round) and every two consecutive pairs have different values
(according to the type of switching).
Armed with the SwitchedRounds algorithm, the threshold technique can be
straightforwardly applied as Algorithm 2 shows. It simply counts the number of
errors occurred during the execution of the protocol where an error is defined as
either a switched round or a wrong response. Both cases are considered as error
because, on the one hand, a switched round might be falsely detected during an
attack, and on the other hand, there is no distinction between a wrong response
due to noise or to an attack. Finally, the protocol is considered to fail if the
number of errors is above a threshold x.
7 The patterns have been written following the POSIX Extended Regular Expres-
sions standard. The symbols ∧ and $ represent the start and the end of the string
respectively.
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Algorithm 1 SwitchedRounds
Require: The challenges c1...cn and the registers R
0, R1, and Q. The prover’s re-
sponses r˜1...r˜n. A threshold ∆l indicating the minimum matching length.
1: Let d1...dn be a sequence such that di = r˜i ⊕Rcii ⊕ f(Ci).
2: Let di...dj be the longest matching with ∧(1+)0| ∧
(1+)$|0(1+)0|0(1+)$|1(0+)1|1(0+)$ on d1...dn.
3: if j − i < ∆l or no matching exists then return the empty set;
4: Let s be 0 if the matching is with 1(0+)1|1(0+)$ and 1 otherwise;
5: Let r be the closest index to i+ 1 such that qr = 1;
6: Let A be the output of SwitchedRounds on d1...di−1;
7: Let B be the output of SwitchedRounds on dj+1...dn;
8: Let E be the union of A∪{(r, s)}∪B such that the indexes are in increasing order
and every two consecutive pairs have different boolean values;
9: return E;
Note that basing the decision on a threshold is a common and easy procedure
but not the best one, especially when the channels are not memoryless. Instead,
the decision procedure could consist in comparing the vector d1...dn with the
error distribution on the noisy channels.
Algorithm 2 Authentication in the presence of noise
Require: All the parameters of the protocol; an integer value x representing the noise
tolerance; and a threshold ∆l.
1: Let E be the output of SwitchedRounds algorithm on input c1...cn, r˜1...r˜n, R
0, R1,
Q, and ∆l;
2: Let d1...dn be a sequence such that di = r˜i ⊕Rcii ⊕ f(Ci).
3: Let s be a boolean variable initialized in 0;
4: Let errors be a counter initialized in 0;
5: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
6: if (i, s′) ∈ E then
7: s← s′;
8: errors+ +;
9: else if (di = 0 and s = 1) or (di = 1 and s = 0) then
10: errors+ +;
11: if errors > x then return fail;
12: else return success;
8 Experiments and comparison
The first part of this section is devoted to compare several DB protocols in term
of mafia fraud resistance, distance fraud resistance, and memory consumption.
The second part takes noise into account and evaluates our proposal w.r.t. the
Hancke and Kuhn’s [11] and Kim and Avoine’s [13] protocols.
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8.1 Noise-free environment
Mafia and distance fraud analyses in a noise-free environment can be found
in [11,13,16,2] for KA2, AT, Poulidor, and HK. In the case of AT and Pouli-
dor, only an upper-bound of their resistance to distance fraud have been pro-
vided [16,9]. Considering those previous results, Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) show the
resistance to mafia and distance frauds respectively for the five considered pro-
tocols in a single chart. For each of them, the configuration that maximizes its
security has been chosen: this is particularly important for AT and KA2 because
different configurations can be used.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that AT and KA2 are the best protocols in terms
of mafia fraud while our proposal is the best in terms of distance fraud. However,
it makes sense to consider the two properties together. To do so, we follow the
technique used in [16] to seek for a good trade-off. This technique first discretizes
the mafia fraud (x) and distance fraud (y) success probabilities. For every pair
(x, y), it then evaluates which protocol is the less round-consuming. This protocol
is considered as the best for the considered pair. In case of draw between two
protocols, the one that is the less memory-consuming is considered as the best
protocol. Using this idea, it is possible to draw what we call a trade-off chart,
which represents for every pair (x, y) the best protocol among the five considered
(see Figure 3(a)).
Figure 3(a) shows that our protocol offers a good trade-off between resistance
to mafia fraud and resistance to distance fraud, especially when a high security
level against distance fraud is expected. In other words, our protocol defeats all
the other considered protocols, except when the expected security levels for mafia
and distance fraud are unbalanced, which is meaningless in common scenarios.
Another interesting comparison could take into consideration the memory
consumption of the protocols. Indeed, for n rounds of the fast phase, AT requires
2n+1−1 bits of memory, which is prohibitive for most pervasive devices. We can
therefore compare protocols that require a linear memory w.r.t. the number
of rounds n. For that, we consider a variant of AT [2], denoted AT-3, that
uses n/3 trees of depth 3 instead of just one tree of depth n. By doing so, the
memory consumption of all the considered protocols is below 5n bits of memory.
The resulting trade-off chart (Figure 3(b)) shows that constraining the memory
consumption considerable reduces the area where AT is the best protocol, but
it also shows that our protocol is also the best trade-off in this scenario.
8.2 Noisy environment
Among the protocols we are considering, only HK [11] and KA2 [13] claim to
be noise resilient. For this reason, we analyze in this section the performance of
our proposal in the presence of noise by comparing it with HK and KA2. The
comparison is performed by considering two properties: availability and security.
Availability is measured in terms of false rejection ratio and security in terms
of mafia fraud resistance. It should be remarked that, distance fraud resistance
16
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Fig. 2. The mafia fraud (Figure 2(a)) and distance fraud (Figure 2(b)) success proba-
bilities considering up to 64 rounds (logarithmic scale). The considered protocols are
KA2 [13], AT [2], Poulidor [16], HK [11], and our protocol.
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. Figure 3(a)
considers the protocols KA2 [13], AT [2], Poulidor [16], HK [11], and our proposal,
while Figure 3(b) changes AT by its low-resource consuming variant AT-3.
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has not been considered for simplicity and because, as shown previously, our
proposal outperforms all the other protocols in terms of this fraud.
An important parameter when measuring availability and security for the
three protocols is the number of allowed incorrect responses (x). In the case of
KA2 and our proposal, other parameters are the minimum size of the pattern
(s) (denoted by ∆l in Algorithm 1) and the number of predefined challenges
p respectively. Theoretical bounds for these parameters in term of the number
of rounds and noise probabilities might be provided, however, we left this non-
trivial task for future work. Instead, we treat the three parameters z = (x, s, p)
as the variables of an optimization problem defined as follows:
Problem 1. Let Π be a distance-bounding protocol, n the number of rounds, pf
the probability of noise in the forward channel, and pb the probability of noise
in the backward channel. Let Πsecuritypf ,pb,n (z) and Π
availability
pf ,pb,n
(z) be the functions
that, given a set of parameters z = (x, s, p), compute the adversary success
probability when mounting a mafia fraud against Π and the false rejection ration
of Π respectively. Given a threshold ∆, the optimization problem consists in:
minimizing Πsecuritypf ,pb,n (z)
subject to Πavailabilitypf ,pb,n (z) ≤ ∆
To follow notations of Problem 1, we assume that Π ∈ {HK, KA2, Our}
where “Our” denotes our proposal. Therefore, algorithms to computeΠsecuritypf ,pb,n (z)
and Πavailabilitypf ,pb,n (z) for every Π ∈ {HK, KA2, Our} are required. In case Π =
HK, HKsecuritypf ,pb,n (z) can be computed as shown in [11], while HK
availability
pf ,pb,n
(z) is
provided by Theorem 6 (see Appendices). For Π = KA2, an algorithm to com-
pute KA2securitypf ,pb,n (z) is given in [13]. Unfortunately, analytical expressions for
KA2availabilitypf ,pb,n (z), Our
security
pf ,pb,n
(z), and Ouravailabilitypf ,pb,n (z), seem to be cumbersome
to find. Therefore, we address this issue by means of simulation.
A simulation means that, given a protocol Π, all the parties (Verifier, Prover,
and Adversary) are simulated. The protocol is then executed 106 times and the
mean of the results (either security or availability) is taken as the estimation.
For the experiments, we consider 48 rounds and a false rejection ratio lower
than 5%. Note that, there does not exist a real consensus on how many rounds
should be executed in a distance bounding protocol. For instance, in [13] up to 40
rounds are considered, while others might vary from 20 to 80. We normally choose
64 rounds for our experiments [16]. However, since our optimization problem is
solved by means of simulations whose performance decrease with the number of
rounds, we drop from 64 to 48 rounds.
Regarding noise we consider two cases: (a) both forward and backward chan-
nels introduce noise with the same probability (pf = pb ≤ 0.05), and (b) the
noise probabilities for the forward and backward channels are not necessarily
equal and are related as follows (pf + pb = 0.05)
8. We do not consider an over-
8 We have performed experiments by considering several other correlations between
pf and pb. The results are not significantly different to those provided by these two
cases, though.
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all noise probability higher than 0.1. Actually, a high noise probability makes
useless all the distance bounding protocols proposed up-to-date.
Armed with these settings, Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b) show the maximum
resistance to mafia fraud for the three protocols considering the cases (a) and
(b) respectively.
Figure 4(a) shows the mafia fraud resistance of the three protocols when
pf = pb. As expected, the higher the noise the lower the provided security of
the three protocols. In this scenario, however, our protocol is clearly the best
even though KA2 achieves the highest resistance when no noise is considered
(pf = pb = 0).
A different scenario (pf + pb = 0.05) is shown by Figure 4(b). There, the
security of HK improves with pf , while KA2 and our protocol are clearly sensitive
to the increase of pf . This is an inherent problem of both protocols since a noise
in the forward channel could cause a “desynchronization” between the prover and
the verifier. Nevertheless, thanks to the noise resilience mechanism proposed in
Section 7.2, our protocol deals with noise much better than KA2 and, in general,
performs better than both HK and KA2.
9 Conclusions
A new lightweight distance-bounding protocol has been introduced in this ar-
ticle. The protocol simultaneously deals with both mafia and distance frauds,
without sacrificing memory or requiring additional computation. The analytical
expressions and experimental results show that the new protocol outperforms the
previous ones. This benefit is obtained through the use of dependent rounds in
the fast phase. The protocol also goes a step further by dealing with the inherent
background noise on the communication channels. This is a serious advantage
compared to the other existing protocols.
Appendix
Theorem 6. Let x be the maximum number of errors allowed by the verifier in
the HK protocol. The false rejection ratio HKavailabilitypf ,pb,n (x) can be computed as
follows:
HKavailabilitypf ,pb,n (x) =
n∑
i=n−x
((
n
i
)
×
(
1− pf
2
− pb + pfpb
)i (pf
2
+ pb − pfpb
)n−i)
.
Proof. Let W be the event that a legitimate prover’s bit-answer is correct for
the verifier. The false rejection ratio HKavailabilitypf ,pb,n (x) can be expressed in terms
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Fig. 4. The maximum resistance to mafia fraud of HK, KA2, and our proposal, con-
sidering 48 rounds, a false rejection ratio lower than 5%, and different values pf and
pb: in Figure 4(a) pf = pb ∈ {0, 0.005, ..., 0.045, 0.05}, and in Figure 4(b) pf +pb = 0.05
where pf ∈ {0, 0.005, ..., 0.045, 0.05}.
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of W as follows:
HKavailabilitypf ,pb,n (x) =
n∑
i=n−x
(
n
i
)
Pr(W )i(1− Pr(W ))n−i. (17)
It should be noted that if a noise occurs on the forward channel then Pr(W ) =
1
2 , which happens with probability pf (1− pb) + pfpb. Thus:
Pr(W ) =
1
2
(pf (1− pb) + pfpb) + (1− pf )(1− pb)
= 1− pf
2
− pb + pfpb. (18)
Equations 17 and 18 yield the expected result.
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